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Strange bedfellows: Interrogating the unintended consequences of integrating countering violent 
extremism with the UN’s Women, Peace and Security agenda in Kenya 
Introduction 
The adoption of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 1325, in October 2000, signaled a 
new normative framework on women, peace and security (WPS). In this resolution the Security Council 
acknowledged, for the first time, the gendered nature of armed conflict and recognized women as actors 
in peacemaking and peacebuilding (Cohn 2008). Since then significant milestones have been reached 
in terms of raising awareness about gender issues in conflict and peace processes, improving responses 
to wartime sexual violence, and increasing the representation of women in international institutions and 
peace missions. However in 2013, with the Security Council declaring its intention to increase its 
attention to WPS issues, in its agenda on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist 
acts, its WPS and counterterrorism agendas began to converge.1 This culminated in the adoption of 
resolution 2242 on WPS in 2015 which calls Member States and the UN to work towards the greater 
integration of their own agendas on WPS, counterterrorism, and countering violent extremism. 
Resolution 2242 also requires Member States and the UN system to adopt a gender-sensitive approach 
to counterterrorism and countering violent extremism, to consult with women’s organizations, and to 
increase the number of women in leadership positions in bodies mandated to counter terrorism and 
violent extremism. Soon after the adoption of the resolution, the connection between violent extremism 
and WPS has become institutionalized in in the subsequent work of the Security Council. In December 
2015, in the UN Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, introducing a new 
global counterterrorism structure and strategies, the Secretary-General called for the protection and 
empowerment of women as a central consideration in strategies against terrorism and violent 
extremism, in line with Security Council resolution 2242 (UN General Assembly 2015).  
One of the challenges of including countering violent extremism in the WPS agenda is that there is no 
agreed definition on what constitutes violent extremism or terrorism (Schomerus, El Taraboulsi-
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McCarthy and Sandhar 2017). Resolution 2242 was adopted in the aftermath of the high-profile 
kidnapping and sexual enslavement of 276 Chibok girls by Boko Haram in Borno State in Nigeria, and 
of 6,800 Yazidis women and girls in Sinjar, in Northern Iraq, by the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (Cetorelli, 
Sasson, Shabila, and Burnham, 2017). Although the resolution does not mention Islam or Islamic 
extremism, during the Open Debate held at the Security Council on 13 and 14 October 2015 references 
to Boko Haram and ‘Islamic State’ were repeatedly mentioned by representatives of Member States 
(UN Security Council 2015). While acknowledging that “violent extremism remains a diverse 
phenomenon, without a clear definition,” the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent 
Extremism adopted shortly after resolution 2242 focuses entirely on Islamic extremist groups, with the 
exception of one reference to the Norwegian far right extremist Anders Breivik (UN General Assembly 
2015, 1). As a result, Muslim-majority Member States, feeling targeted, resisted the Plan of Action and 
insisted on the need to distance Islam from violent extremism (Ucko, 2018). Without agreed definitions 
of terrorism and violent extremism, the policy shift to include these in the focus of the WPS is 
problematic.  
At the time of the adoption of resolution 2242 many feminist scholars warned that, based on the legacy 
of the so-called ‘war on terror’ waged in the aftermath of 9/11, the inclusion of violent extremism within 
the WPS framework would cause irreversible damage. The ‘war on terror’ primarily targets Muslims 
and Muslim states as the source of terrorism and so far has resulted in colossal destruction, insecurity 
and suffering. Ní Aoláin (2016) in particular argues that because women do not get to define what 
constitutes terrorism or decide on the terms of their engagement with the counterterrorism agenda, such 
a policy shift would reinforce gender essentialism and confer legitimacy on counterterrorism measures, 
resulting in greater insecurity for women. This article contributes to the wider debate on the UN 
resolution on WPS and countering violent extremism by adding supporting evidence from field research 
in Kenya to Ní Aoláin’s argument that it is dangerous to associate these two agendas. I argue that in the 
Kenyan context, integrating countering violent extremism with the WPS agenda has failed to change 
country’s androcentric, militaristic, racialized, elitist, and top-down approach to conceptualizing and 
responding to violent extremism. The absence of a gender-centered and locally relevant definition of 
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violent extremism has left the sources of extremism and insecurity in the lives of women in Kenya 
largely untouched.  Far from improving gender security, this new policy shift has exacerbated 
discrimination against the women of Muslim minorities, redirected funding from peacebuilding and 
development-focused projects, and increased the insecurity experienced by local communities. Based 
on the findings of the Kenyan case study, I argue that unless the concept of violent extremism is 
redefined to include sources of gender insecurities, the risk to the WPS framework is extremely high. 
Such risk is heightened by the WPS resolutions’ weak commitments to gender equality, silence on race 
and intersectionality and problematic stance on gender security. For the WPS project to be saved its 
agenda must be reinvented to encapsulate a feminist security perspective that challenges rather than 
condones militarism, imperialism, colonialism, racism, inequality, and exclusion. 
The article starts with a brief summary of the methodology followed by four main sections: the first 
begins with a brief discussion of feminist literature and a critique of the WPS agenda; the second section 
discusses violent extremism in Kenya; the third examines the implementation of the WPS resolutions 
in countering violent extremism in Kenya; and the fourth describes the implications of integrating 
countering violent extremism within the WPS agenda for women and local communities in Kenya. The 
article concludes by discussing the main findings in the light of feminist theory and literature.  
Methodology 
This article is based on rich empirical data and reflections derived from fieldwork conducted in 2018 
studying the international, national, and local integration of countering violent extremism with the WPS 
agenda. 2 Interviews were conducted in Kenya, in January and February 2018, and in New York, in the 
spring of 2018. The choice of Kenya was motivated by ease of access, the recent rise in violent 
extremist-related incidents, and the fact that Kenya is a diverse country with a sizable Muslim minority. 
Nairobi was selected for its ethnic and religious diversity, the frequency of terrorism-related incidents 
and counterterrorism operations, and the convenient presence of a large number in international NGOs, 
donor agencies, civil society organizations, and policymakers. The participants in this study were 
selected both purposefully and using a snowball technique based on their professional background and 
expertise. As this research was focused on policy level, the research participants’ selection criteria did 
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not include victims of violent extremism or actively seek to speak to these.  I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with twenty key informants drawn from civil society organizations, and from researchers 
and security experts working on violent extremism and/or gender issues with a focus on WPS. Although 
this project was focused at the policy level, the research also included conversations with members of 
the local communities of Majengo and Eastleigh in Nairobi. It is through these conversations that 
personal narratives about victimization at the hand of extremist groups and government agents emerged.  
Besides these I conducted thirteen interviews with members of UN agencies and the international 
community in New York (10) and in Kenya (3). The study received all the necessary ethical clearance 
for conducting the fieldwork and I followed all the ethical guidance provided by the review boards in 
relation to conducting research on sensitive topics strictly. The names of all the participants cited in this 
article have been changed for the purpose of anonymity.3  
Feminist Critique of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda 
Although the WPS agenda was celebrated as a breakthrough, many feminist scholars have criticized it 
for compromising on important feminist principles. One such critique relates to the WPS framework’s 
treatment of “gender” as synonymous with “women”. One of the main contributions of feminism is the 
reconstitution of gender as a social category, and in doing so challenging biological certainties and 
treating gender differences as socially constructed, fluid and contestable. Feminists have discussed how 
gender, as both a discursive system and an analytical category, is used to signify power and promote 
violence and conflict. Spike Peterson (1992), Tickner (1992) and many others have highlighted the role 
of gendered ideologies and identities in producing and reproducing violence and structural insecurities, 
calling on governments to radically change the way they conceptualize and deliver security. Scholars 
such as Shephered (2008), Charlesworth and Chinkin (2006) have argued that resolution 1325 treats 
“gender” as synonymous with “women” and in doing so fails to recognize the relational quality of 
gender representation. Otto (2006,167) argues that “without active contestation of gender dualities and 
hierarchies, the ‘mindset’ will never change and the purportedly social understanding of gender will 
blur with the biological certainties that have legitimated militarism and women's inequality.” Feminist 
scholars have problematized the WPS resolutions’ failure to address the structural factors that constrain 
and inhibit women’s agency while at the same time trying to push for women’s inclusion. Otto 
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(2010,106) argues that “the loudest silence characterizing resolution 1325 is the absence of any 
reference to addressing the structural causes of women’s inequality, like women’s economic 
marginalization, which must be addressed before the rhetoric of participation has any hope of translating 
into practice.” Without addressing the broader social hierarchies of gender, women’s participation in 
the male-dominated and conceptualized security sphere will not result in any meaningful transformation 
and no alternative perspective on peace and security will emerge.  
The second main feminist criticism of the WPS framework relevant to this study is the resolutions’ 
approach to security. Feminist scholars have fundamentally reconfigured the concept of security as a 
state of being where all forms of violence and exploitation – physical, structural and ecological – are 
diminished (Tickner 1997; Enloe 1990). Scholars such as Cockbrurn (1998) Tickner (1992) and Enloe 
(1993; 2010) have all demonstrated that women experience violence as a continuum. Feminist scholars 
have linked gender inequality to militarism. Tickner (1992) argues that institutionalized gender 
inequality creates a society that accepts the use of force. Caprioli (2000) provides convincing statistical 
evidence of the link between gender inequality indicators and states’ likelihood of engaging in conflict 
and violence.  The meaning of “security” in the WPS framework has been problematized by feminist 
scholars who find its exclusive focus on conflict and post-conflict contexts, failure to condemn 
militarism, overemphasis on conflict-related sexual violence, and silence regarding gender equality, 
particularly in terms of access to power and resources, highly problematic. Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen 
(2001) argue that there is no post-conflict for women, since the violence they experience during conflict 
does not end with the negotiation of a peace deal. Violence against women, as Eisenstein (2007) 
elucidates, is a parallel form of war on women in times of conflict as well as peace. Mcleod (2011, 495) 
argues that the demarcation between conflict and post conflict “is a discourse with contested temporal 
and special aspects […] where certain ways are thrown into focus and others are downplayed.” Feminist 
scholars have also decried the failure of the WPS resolutions to condemn war, militarism and the arms 
race (Cockburn 2007). Shepherd (2016) argues that the lack of commitment to anti-militarism in the 
WPS agenda has resulted in policies that make war safer for women without actively seeking to end 
conflicts, and thus, has bolstered militarism and elite-centric security governance that the resolutions 
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are meant to challenge. Feminist scholars have also criticized the overemphasis on conflict-related 
sexual violence in the WPS agenda, contrasting this with its silence on sexual violence by civilians and 
in peacetime, making the latter seem ordinary and even tolerable (Henry 2013; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 
2013; Aroussi 2017). Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn (2012) argue that the WPS resolution prioritizes 
sexual violence at the expense of other concerns for women that may be more closely-linked to 
achieving their real security. Scholars have called for the transformation of the WPS concept of security 
to include women’s social, economic, political and legal security (Aroussi 2015). This is particularly 
important as gender inequality is thought to be linked to violence, conflict, and militarism. In the 
absence of a strong WPS emphasis on gender equality and without seeking to transform the structures 
that produce and sustain power inequality and economic, social, and political marginalization this new 
policy shift will feed further into a gendered construction of state and international security that 
privileges, if not encourages, violence and militarism.   
The third feminist criticism of the WPS framework that is relevant to this discussion is its failure to 
acknowledge how various forms of inequality and oppression such as racism, ethnocentrism, 
colonialism, heterosexism, and class privilege, among others, intersect with gender oppression to 
buttress inequality and exclusion. Feminist scholars have condemned the resolutions’ treatment of 
“women” as a homogenous category with similar needs and priorities. Jansson and Eduards (2016) 
argue that the WPS resolutions divide women into two homogenous categories, voiceless victims, and 
representatives and protectors of other women, silencing all other differences such as of class, cast, 
race, ethnicity, nationality, and geographical location. Here, the relationship between women is 
considered non-hierarchical and devoid of gender power and dominance, and in this way the WPS 
framework reproduces and reinforces inequality between women. Scholars have particularly questioned 
the power of speaking security within the WPS framework (Basu 2013; Sjoberg 2011; Wibben 2011), 
and called for an intersectional approach that takes into consideration the diversity of women’s voices 
and the differences among women in terms of race, ethnicity, and class privilege. Hoewer (2013) 
highlights the silence of the WPS framework on the ethno-nationalist cleavages in the context of 
Northern Ireland that have resulted in women’s exclusion from the male-dominated peace process. De 
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Almagro (2018) argues that implementing the WPS framework in the Global South has primarily 
benefited local upper-middle-class, English-speaking, educated, and well-connected elites, who have 
become intermediaries between the international community and grassroots women’s groups. Pratt 
(2013, 773), using a postcolonial feminist lens, criticizes the absence of race in the WPS framework, 
arguing that the UN body of resolutions on WPS privileges gender above race, class, or other significant 
relations of power in understanding women’s experiences and responses to conflict and in doing so it 
“re-inscribes racial–sexual hierarchies in international security, evoking continuities and discontinuities 
with colonialism”. Read in this way the WPS framework becomes “a process of securitization, in which 
women and girls in conflict areas are constituted as the objects of security, ‘brown men’ as threats to 
international peace and security, and the international community as the legitimate agents of security” 
(ibid, 777). The protection of women and girls in this securitization discourse becomes a justification 
for interventionist wars, militarism, and violence. In her discussion of security as emancipation, Basu 
(2013) argues that unless there is a fundamental change in the production and nature of power, listening 
to the experiences of the subjugated narrated by elites, while still important, is not enough to deliver 
security. Instead we should go far beyond disrupting ‘power over’ to re-conceptualize power as the 
capacity to empower oneself and others.  
Violent Extremism in Kenya: A Continuum of Violence 
Kenya has lived through a series of terrorism-related incidents, linked to global politics and 
transnational terrorist networks, such as Al-Qaida, including the 1980 Norfolk hotel bombing and the 
murderous 1998 attack on the US embassy that killed 213 people and injured around 4,000 others. In 
2011, following a number of abductions of foreign tourists and aid workers by Al-Shabaab, an Islamist 
insurgent group based in Somalia, the Kenyan government launched the military Operation Linda 
Nchi against Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia with 2000 members of the Kenyan Defense force (Rye 
Olsen 2011). By early June 2012, The Kenyan forces were formally integrated into the African Union 
Mission in Somalia, a regional peace support mission composed of 22,000 troops from six African 
countries (Rye Olsen 2011). As a result, since 2011 retaliatory attacks by Al-Shabaab targeting police 
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stations, police vehicles, night clubs, bars, churches, shops, and buses in Nairobi, Mombasa, and the 
North Eastern Province have intensified (Williams 2014). The deadliest attacks linked to Al-Shabaab 
in Kenya have been the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, killing 67 people, and the 2015 massacre 
in Garissa at Garissa University College in which 148 people died (Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke, 
and Humphrey 2016).  Most recently, in January 2019 an attack on the DusitD2 hotel complex in 
Nairobi left 21 dead (Sevenzo, Karimi, and Smith-Spark 2019). As a result of this violence, the 
Kenyan government’s 2016 National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism adopted a 
definition of violent extremism focusing on Islamic extremism and groups such as Al-Shabaab 
and the ‘Islamic State’:  
There are multiple forms of violent extremism but the main threat to Kenya is based on Salafi-
Jihadi ideology that is embraced by Al Shabaab group (Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidin), Al 
Qaeda’s affiliate in the Horn of Africa, and other terrorist organizations such as Dae’sh (ISIS) 
that seek ‘entry’ into the Horn of Africa. (Kenyan National Strategy to Counter Violent 
Extremism 2016, 9).  
This framing, as I will argue below, is based on a narrow, top-down, state-centered, and donor led 
approach to what counts as violent extremism, and does not reflect the nature of this phenomenon in 
the country or the multifaceted insecurity experienced in local communities every day. 
With growing concern about Al-Shabaab, the Kenyan State has employed overtly militarized 
counterterrorism operations and hard security responses targeting Muslim and Somali communities 
(Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels 2016). For instance, in April 2014, Operation Usalama Watch which was 
conducted to flush out Al-Shabaab supporters, involved house-to-house searches and indiscriminately 
targeted the entire Muslim and particularly ethically Somali communities in Eastleigh and Mombasa 
with arbitrary mass arrests, inhumane treatment, harassment, extortion, deportation, relocation, 
extrajudicial killings, and forced disappearances (Ndung’u, Salifu, and Sigsworth 2017, 20; Villa-
Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke, and Humphrey 2016, 2). The state’s use of violence resulted in the deaths 
of 58 innocent civilians between 2011 and 2017 (University of Uppsala Conflict database 2017). This 
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counterproductive hard-security response to Al-Shabaab has been likened “to killing mosquito with a 
hammer” (Lind, Mutahi, and Oosterom 2017, 119). Rather than curbing Al-Shabaab’s violence, 
Kenya’s beefed-up approach to counterterrorism has led to an increase in the number of attacks in the 
country (Lind, Mutahi, and Oosterom 2017). Many members of the Muslim and particularly Somali 
communities see the excessive use of violence by the anti-terror police as a state-led violent extremism. 
For instance, Maria a gender expert and a member of a peacebuilding NGO in Kenya with experience 
of conducting research on violent extremism argued: 
When asked about violent extremism, people were telling us that according to them the police 
were the violent extremists. Why? Because it was them who came to their homes in the middle 
of the night, ransacked their houses and took their children away. So this was very much 
experience-based. (Maria 5 February 2018, NGO, Nairobi) 
Therefore, the national counterterrorism’s exclusive focus on Al-Shabaab and Islamic extremism, 
particularly in a country with a sizeable Muslim and ethically Somali minority, is very problematic.  
 
Besides the threat of Al-Shabaab and Islamic extremism, Kenya has also experienced high-level 
political violence from its political elites aiming to cripple and silence the opposition  (Kagwanja 
2003). For instance, in March 1975, two bombs were used in central Nairobi to target the politician 
J.M. Kariuki resulting in the death of many civilians (Ngotho 2018). Political violence motivated by 
rivalry over access to land, power and resources and linked to communal and criminal violence 
typically peaks with each election (Kanyinga 2009).  In 2007, election violence was the cause of the 
death of 1,133 people, the displacement of 600,000 others, and almost drove the country to civil war 
(Barkan 2013). Violent groups such as the Mungiki are frequently mobilized at the time of 
elections to terrorize civilians and commit mass atrocities, including gang rape and sexual violence 
(Kiman 2016).4 The level of inter-clan violence linked to the struggle for political power, land, and 
resources is also extremely high in Kenya. According to the Uppsala University Conflict Database inter-
clan violence in Kenya has claimed the lives of 991 civilians between 2011 and 2017 compared to the 
382 civilian murdered by Al-Shabaab during the same period (Uppsala University Conflict Database 
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2017). Yet, in Kenya this kind of politically-motivated violence is depoliticized, masked as 
criminal or communal violence, and dismissively referred to as thuggery, crime, cattle rustling, or 
ethnic, land, or border clashes (Kagwanja 2003). The informal character of such violence has 
allowed the Kenyan State to claim victim status and thus evade accountability (Kagwanja 2003).  
 
All of these factors contribute to the significant difference between what the government considers 
violent extremism and what the local population and civil society organizations define as violent 
extremism. Many respondents who are members of communities and civil society organizations in 
Kenya argued that the activities of groups such as the Mungiki, the Kaya Bombo and the Mombasa 
Republican Council are also forms of violent extremism. For instance, George a director of a local 
peacebuilding NGO working with local communities on youth and violence argued:   
Many researchers make the mistake of confining extremism to extreme Islamic ideologies and 
groups.  But extremism in Kenya is not confined to religion. The coast, for the longest time, 
has had organized criminal groups such as the Kaya Bombo and the Mombasa Republican 
Council (MRC).  There is a link between crime and violent extremism. These criminal groups 
are a form of violent extremism [in] the way they operate and their activities, which are both 
violent and extreme. (George, NGO, 8 February 2018, Nairobi) 
Hekima, a Muslim woman from Nairobi, the mother of two teenage boys who had lost their lives in 
violent extremism, explained: 
Violent extremism goes beyond Islamic extremism and Al-Shabaab. For example, there are 
gangs and militias that are killing people in Majengo and Eastleigh. It is not just about Islamic 
radicalization or going to Somalia. We also have other internal issues related to gangs and 
violence. (Hekima, 12 February 2018, community member, Nairobi) 
The way in which local actors understand violent extremism is largely shaped by their personal 
experience of violence and influenced by their gender, ethnicity, religion, social class and geographical 
location. For instance, while some see the Mombasa Republican Council as a violent extremist group, 
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others, particularly those living along the coast, see the group as a political movement with a legitimate 
purpose. Likewise, many Kenyan Somalis living in areas such as Eastleigh perceive police brutality as 
a form of state-sponsored violent extremism, a view that would not be shared by others who have not 
been affected by police heavy-handedness. 
 
 In defining violent extremism, it is important to understand not only what is counted but also what is 
left out. In Kenya’s national counterterrorism strategy, the focus on Al-Shabaab as the source of violent 
extremism epitomizes the public-private dichotomy reflecting a male perspective on violence that 
prioritizes the public over the private realm. Kenya is a deeply patriarchal society with very high gender 
inequality and violence against women. Research in this area demonstrated that sexual and gender-
based violence make up a key part of the violence committed at times of elections and political transition 
(Thomas, Masinjila, and Bere 2013).  During the 2007 post-election crisis in Kenya hospitals in some 
areas saw three times the normal intake of rape and gang rape casualties at (ibid). Yet the government 
has done very little to prevent this form of violence or to ensure that survivors are able to access justice 
and reparation (Shackel and Fiske 2016). In 2011, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) expressed concern about the prevalence of patriarchal attitudes, negative 
gender stereotypes and harmful cultural norms, practices, and traditions in all spheres of life in Kenya, 
and condemned the government’s failure to take serious action to modify or eliminate these (CEDAW 
2011). The Committee warned that such stereotypes contribute to the persistence of violence against 
women, including violence at the hands of intimate partners, sexual violence, female genital mutilation, 
polygamy, bride price, and wife inheritance (ibid). According to UN Women 2014 data, the percentage 
of lifetime physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence in Kenya was 40.7 per cent (UNWomen 
2018). Child marriage and female genital mutilation in the country were also high at 23 and 21 per cent 
respectively (UNWomen 2018). Gender-based violence, although very prevalent particularly in 
informal settlements (Swart 2012), is not defined as violent extremism in Kenya.  
 
Since the 2007 post-election violence and the adoption of the 2010 Constitution, Kenya has moved 
towards establishing devolved institutions at county level. Influenced by the devolution process but 
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perhaps also in recognition of the different challenges of violent extremism facing its various counties 
the Kenyan government decided to develop county-level action plans on counterterrorism and violent 
extremism. Although the Kenyan government organized, in the development of these plans, county-
level consultations with local communities on how to tackle violent extremism, there was no scope in 
this process for redefining violent extremism from a local or a gender perspective.  
 
While recognizing the diversity of what constitutes local priorities my interviewees did not highlight 
countering violent extremism, particularly when this is narrowly defined as Islamic extremism, as a 
local priority.5 Many members of civil society organizations argued that defining violent extremism as 
Islamic extremism is the result of donor-led Western agendas.  Lucy, a member of a peacebuilding 
NGO, stated: 
Violent extremism in Kenya is mainly a priority for the security actors and for donors.  Who is 
funding the countering violent extremism programs? It is the Western countries. They are 
funding it because as the years progress this has become a migration concern, and so it is in 
their interest that this is managed. The fear in Western countries cannot be underestimated. This 
is about Western governments being terrified of migration and the idea that all these extremists 
are going to go there and threaten their populations. (Lucy, NGO, 11 February 2018, Nairobi)  
 
Participants also argued that countering the violence of groups such as Al-Shabaab has become a 
priority for the Kenyan government and security forces because it is a source of funding and foreign 
aid, but that addressing the other sources of insecurity that they experience every day, particularly police 
brutality, gang-related violence, and gender-based violence, is far more important than defeating Al-
Shabaab. Members of civil society organizations maintained that violent extremism in Kenya is not 
ideologically driven, as stated in the National Counterterrorism (2016) Strategy, but rather intrinsically 
linked to economic, political, and social marginalization. In their view, the local priorities should be 
development, gender equality, peace, and human rights rather than tackling Al-Shabaab.  Maria 
elucidated: 
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Countering violent extremism is not a priority for the people here unless we refocus on 
prevention and we take it back to what it was originally – that is, development, peacebuilding, 
and human rights; but then it’s not sexy for Western governments. (Maria 5 February 2018, 
NGO Nairobi) 
Maria concluded that understandably those who are struggling daily to survive do not see tackling 
violent extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab as a priority.  
 
Despite the strong emerging evidence of linkages between economic and political marginalization, 
grievances against the state and recruitment into groups such as Al Shahab (Allan, Glazzard, Jesperson, 
Reddy-Tumu, and Winterbotham 2015), the Kenyan government continues to focus on ideology as the 
driver of violent extremism, ignoring  the root causes of this problem. Ian, a representative of a donor 
government based in Nairobi stated:  
From conversations with our counterparts, the government of Kenya, through their national 
strategy, are very much focused on ideology being kind of the sole driver for violent 
extremism in Kenya. But there are other more structural issues that are enabling the 
environment for recruitment and for people to join extremist groups, like major political 
grievances -- things like marginalization, discrimination, historical injustices against certain 
communities, continued extra-judicial killings and highly-securitized approaches. But our 
government counterparts are not too willing to talk about that. (Ian, 9 February 2018, Donor 
Government, Nairobi) 
 
WPS and Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya 
There is incontrovertible evidence that women play an important role in the perpetration of violence, 
including terrorism (Alison 2009; Bloom 2011; Gardner 2018).  However, in Kenya violent extremism 
is largely understood as a male youth issue (Mambo ya vijana) (Ndung’u, Salifu, and Sigsworth 2017, 
30). Although Al-Shabaab has deployed women as suicide bombers in attacks in Somalia on a few 
occasions, most of those who join Al-Shabaab do so as brides and to cook, clean and fulfil other 
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supportive roles including recruitment and intelligence-gathering, arranging financial transactions and 
providing medical care rather than fighting on the front line (ibid). Because women are not perceived 
as perpetrators of terrorism they have been left out of this security-dominated countering violent 
extremism agenda. The text of the 2016 Kenya National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism 
does not pay sufficient attention to gender or women’s participation in its policies and programs to 
counter violent extremism, and nor did the process of adopting Kenya’s National Counterterrorism 
Strategy involve consultation with women’s organizations or women in affected communities.6  Beyond 
a brief reference to the threat of extremism in its introduction, the 2016 Kenyan National Action Plan 
(NAP) on Women, Peace and Security does not refer to terrorism or violent extremism in its text, nor 
in the matrix specifying the plan’s actions and indicators (Kenya NAP 2016). Maria, the gender expert 
and member of a peacebuilding NGO mentioned above, contended that in Kenya the WPS framework 
is not seen as relevant to security matters such as violent extremism. This was clear to her based on the 
government’s decision to host the Kenyan NAP in the “underfunded and overburdened” Ministry of 
Gender rather than at the Ministry of Interior or Foreign Affairs. She went on: 
The NAP was launched by the President’s wife! Now, why would the National Action Plan on 
Women, Peace and Security not be launched by the Minister for Interior, Security and the 
President himself? It is on peace and security? So the focus is on the women’s aspect and not 
on peace and security. We were given kangas [sarong] for the event! …When you give kangas, 
even the men who attended the event would start to think “OK, this is a women’s issue and not 
a peace and security discussion”. (Maria, 5 February 2018, NGO) 
Participants from local and international organizations also complained of the lack of attention to gender 
in efforts tackling violent extremism. Many argued that the Kenyan government is unwilling to 
adequately integrate gender in efforts aimed at countering violent extremism. Respondents from civil 
society organizations claimed that members of the security forces are particularly resistant to gender 
issues and to engaging with women’s groups.  Miranda, a member of a faith-based local NGO, stated: 
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People from the military and senior police still feel strongly against engagement with civil 
society in a security sphere and the ability of civil society to understand enough about security 
to be able to engage in CVE. This is just about the engagement and the role of civil society. 
Now imagine how this would be now that we’re moving to the women’s sphere. (Miranda, 13 
February 2018, NGO Nairobi) 
Christina, a member of an international organization that delivers training for the police and security 
forces in Kenya, argued that engaging with the security forces on a human-rights-based approach to 
counterterrorism is already a challenge, which makes it even more difficult to include training on the 
gender dimension of violent extremism in the curriculum. She went on:  
There are so many negotiations with the government actors on the content of the curriculum. 
Mostly they are interested in how do we do surveillance better, better investigation tactics, and 
technical counterterrorism work. But we’re constantly fighting to keep the focus on prevention, 
human rights and engaging with communities, etc. so we always have to compromise on what 
is accepted and what isn’t. So in our training we don’t do anything about gender. (Christina 10 
February 2018, International Organization, Nairobi) 
In an informal discussion on the absence of gender from the national strategy on counterterrorism with 
Tom, a European diplomat based in Kenya, he argued that women in Kenya do not have an important 
role in terrorism and hence gender in the national strategy on counterterrorism is not a priority. He 
concluded that while it is better to have a national strategy than not to have one, one has to be realistic 
in terms of what to expect from this document (Tom, 9 February 2018, Diplomat, Nairobi). The 
disconnect between gender and the sphere of violent extremism in Kenya became even more evident 
when a USD 600,000 study on masculinity, gender norms, and violent extremism, funded by USAID, 
had to be abandoned due to the Kenyan government’s objections and uproar against the idea that 
heteronormative hyper-masculinity has anything to do with violent extremism (Harrington 2018; Dahir 
2018). 
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At the national level, the discussion of gender in violent extremism was dominated by gender 
stereotypes based on the idea of women as wives, mothers and victims of extremism. For example 
Christina, a member of an international NGO in Kenya, reflected:  
The idea here is that women only go there to Somalia  as wives and jihadi brides, but then why 
isn’t anyone thinking that there are women who go there because they believe in the cause? So 
the only reason a woman will go and join Al-Shabaab is because there’s a man who put her up 
to it or that there is a man that she is going to be married to. (Christina, 10 February 2018, 
International NGO, Nairobi) 
The emphasis on women’s participation in preventing and countering violent extremism in the UN 
resolution 2242 has not resulted in an increased number of women involved in this area, particularly at 
the decision-making level. Many respondents in this study complained that women from communities 
affected by violent extremism are seen by the government only as useful sources of intelligence and are 
excluded from the decision-making. As Maria put it:  
Women are not included in finding the solution in terms of preventing or countering violent 
extremism, or in conversations on these issues. So they are only seen as sources of information 
about their sons, husbands and daughters, but not at the table to make positions and to contribute 
to this conversation. (Maria 5 February 2018, NGO, Nairobi) 
 One unintended consequence of the inclusion of countering violent extremism in the WPS framework 
is the narrowing of space for the participation and engagement of women, particularly those from 
marginalized communities. Nwangwu and Ezeibe (2019) argue that in many African countries women’s 
involvement in security issues is perceived as both culturally inacceptable and offensive to men. In a 
society that remains highly patriarchal and where access to power and resources is linked to ethnicity, 
participation in the security sphere at the decision-making level remains a male but also an elite 
privilege. Instead of improving women’s participation in addressing violent extremism, the policy move 
to bring violent extremism into the WPS agenda has increased the participation of men and a few elite 
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women in this sphere, something that many of the female respondents in this study protested about. 
Fatuma, who works for a local organization specialized in the prevention of violent extremism, 
complained that in Kenya many of those working on violent extremism, particularly at the decision-
making level, including those in the civil society, men belonging to the elite. Reflecting on her own 
experience she lamented that women and especially those from Muslim minorities are excluded and 
“underutilized”:  
Even when [organizations] get funding for a project on gender and countering violent 
extremism they’ll still not involve women. They will do it with men, but [they] say “This is 
what we’re doing for women.” Women haven’t really been given their right place when it 
comes to fighting extremism. It’s still not happening. Our society is still very patriarchal. 
(Fatuma 9 February 2018, NGO, Nairobi)  
   
Consequences for Women and Local Communities on the Ground 
The interviewees complained that the increasing attention to violent extremism has redirected funding 
from areas such as gender, development, and peacebuilding to the security sector, impacting on funding 
for civil society and women’s organizations: 
The interest in countering violent extremism has redirected funds from peacebuilding and 
gender projects to the focus on CVE. […] All development projects are suffering now. Women 
are not a security priority, so how do they fit into this security-led agenda? I’m now not sure 
who is still interested in [resolution] 1325, as I see the [donors’] focus is shifting to countering 
violent extremism. This new focus on countering violent extremism has even pushed these 
things [Resolution 1325] further down. (Maria, 5 February 2018, NGO Nairobi) 
 
Donors’ interest in violent extremism, directly or indirectly, puts tension on civil society organizations, 
which feel pressured to apply for funding and to develop programs in this area, leading to a proliferation 
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of violent extremism related projects in Kenya. Ian, a representative of a donor government based in 
Nairobi, tried to shed light on this phenomenon: 
There is an increased funding for counterterrorism programming and countering violent 
extremism. What you’ve seen in Kenya is a shift in many projects that were historically focused 
on, let’s say, land-based or cattle-based conflicts. These now have components of countering 
violent extremism added to them.  What we’ve seen from organizations in Kenya is that projects 
have different hats that they wear depending on what the funders’ interests are. (Ian, 8 February 
2018, Donor Government, Nairobi)  
One of the dilemmas that was repeatedly brought up in interviews by respondents from civil society 
was the ideological and financial struggle that they face within their organizations between choice of 
applying for funding to address violent extremism and the risk of not being able to continue their work. 
Many organizations in Kenya continue to refuse to engage in any way with actors and funding involving 
the violent extremism agenda for ideological but also for safety and security reasons, and as a result 
their access to funding has suffered considerably.7 
 
Although what counts as preventing violent extremism can be loosely interpreted to include human 
rights, youth employment, and education programs, participants in this research complained of 
increasing difficulty in securing funding for projects that frame violent extremism broadly rather than 
narrowing it to Islamic extremism. George, the director of the peacebuilding NGO, had a project on 
youth and violent extremism that tackled young people joining organized criminal groups: 
 
We really struggled to get funding because our project was not seen as specifically countering 
violent extremism, and so it cannot immediately be supported [as such]. Reintegrating kids, 
supporting them, livelihood activities, all of that is actually countering violent extremism, but 
it is an argument that is not easily accepted by donors. The problem is that they’re too careful 
and too cautious to make sure that their support is aligned to the government’s priorities and 
definition of violent extremism. (George, NGO, 8 February 2018, Nairobi) 
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Another consequence of including countering violent extremism in the WPS agenda is that it 
exacerbates the stigmatization, insecurity and exclusion suffered by the Muslim community, especially 
women. The marginalization and unequal citizenship status of Muslim communities in Kenya are well-
recognized by scholars (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2017).  In this study, the participants argued that 
Muslims are doubly vetted when they apply for identity cards and passports. Participants also discussed 
the racial profiling of Muslims by the Kenyan police and security forces during security checks. Because 
of their visibility Muslim women who wear jilbaabs, veils or headscarves are particularly targeted for 
security checks. Participants also complained of the exaggerated use of state violence during 
counterterrorism operations. All of these factors according to the respondents are making the Muslim 
communities feel under attack and increasing their alienation and grievances against the state: 
Whenever we have a terrorist attack, whether it happens in Westgate or in Mombasa, the minute 
it happens there will be a crackdown on all Somali-populated areas in Eastleigh in Nairobi, in 
Garissa, in Majengo etc.  Communities have been shamed. In Wajhir, after the massacre men 
have been made to lie on the tarmac in public, so they could not protect their families and 
communities. So there is a lot of shame. You know the communities that are branded with 
violent extremism, they suffer the consequences of this communally. (Maria, 5 February 2018, 
NGO Nairobi) 
 
This hard security approach has led to “higher levels of societal prejudice against Muslims, increasing 
social alienation and fostering radicalization among targeted communities” (Luengo-Cabrera and 
Pauwels  2016, 2).  Women whose children have left home to join Al-Shabaab often bear the brunt of 
the stigma and societal prejudice. Hekima, the mother who lost two teenage sons to violent extremism, 
spoke about the stigmatization that she and other women encountered in their mixed community after 
their children joined Al-Shabaab:  
In my community the government is against you and the community is against you. We are 
between two hard plates. People try to avoid me. After my sons went to Somalia many members 
of the community thought I was getting money from Al-Shabaab. Whenever I go somewhere, 
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or whenever there’s something in the community like iftar [breaking the fast] during 
Ramadhan, they say “Why is she here? What is she doing here?”. (Hekima, 12 February 2018, 
community member, Nairobi) 
Hekima added that many mothers of children who have joined Al-Shabaab find themselves rejected 
by their spouses and blamed for their children’s actions: 
 After my sons left for Somalia my husband also left. He started a new life. He was saying my 
boys were their mother’s sons.  Most of the women whose sons have left for Somalia don’t 
have the support of their husbands. Swahili men are like that. If there’s a problem in the first 
wife’s house, the man goes to the house of the second wife. If there’s a problem in the house 
it’s always the woman’s fault. (Hekima, 12 February 2018, community member, Nairobi) 
Finally, rather than improving women’s security, bringing violent extremism into the WPS sphere, 
particularly in the absence of a human-rights-based approach to counterterrorism, has created additional 
violence and insecurity for women and their communities in Kenya. Hekima spoke of the police 
harassment she experienced after reporting her sons’ disappearance:  
The anti-terror police started coming to our homes asking “Where is Al-Shabaab?” They used 
to come in large numbers, in the middle of the night, even fifty of them. They threatened me, 
they ransacked the house, they stole things. They said now that my sons are gone, Al-Shabaab 
must be sending money to me. Every time something happens in the rest of the country, such 
as the Westgate and Garissa attacks, they come back and start threatening us, the mothers, again. 
After my second son died the anti-terror police came to me and said “Can you work with us as 
an informer?” But I refused. (Hekima, 12 February 2018, community member, Nairobi) 
Because of their fear of the anti-terror police members of the communities do not want to associate with 
women who had dealings with the police. Lucy described the story of a number of youths from 
Mombasa who were arbitrarily arrested after the 2015 attack:  
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When they went back to their communities nobody wanted to associate with them anymore. 
They will say “You are now on the police radar, I don’t want to be your friend.” What happened 
is that their mothers couldn’t go to the market, couldn’t go to social places, couldn’t do anything 
because everybody is like “Aha, if I associate with you, next time the police will be at my door 
asking me questions.” (Lucy, NGO, 11 February 2018, Nairobi)  
  
Participants discussed the methods used by the police and the danger of forced disappearances and 
extra-judicial killings: 
The anti-terror police had their own informers within the community; when they intervened 
here they used to pick up young men and after picking them up, some disappeared forever and 
others were found killed. The anti-terror police, when they intervened it was just arbitrarily 
picking people up, disappearances, and killings. (Hekima, 12 February 2018, community 
member, Nairobi) 
 
The fear of such disappearances and extra-judicial killings has made women reluctant to talk openly 
about their children’s radicalization. Extra-judicial killings were a frequent theme in the interviews. For 
example, Miranda argued: 
The security officers in Kenya take the hard approach. So if you go to them and say “I have 
these returnees and they need rehabilitation,” the next thing is “Okay, let me take them to get 
information,” and then two or three days later this boy or this girl will be found dead. (Miranda 
13 February 2018, NGO, Nairobi) 
 
It must also be noted that people who interact with the police are targeted by extremist groups as 
informers and may be tracked down and killed. Hekima’s second son was shot dead after he escaped 
and returned to Kenya from Somalia, presumably by members of Al-Shabaab. In the absence of 
protection and a human-rights-based approach to countering violent extremism, playing a visible role 
in this area can be extremely dangerous for women. Along these lines Hekima argued: 
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Given a chance, women can play a role in the community by speaking about the warning signs 
and their experiences, because they are the first to notice these changes in their children or 
spouses. But then at the community level people are afraid that the anti-terror police will come 
and take their children away or kill them. Also if you talk about your experience people say 
“Oh, you’re an informer.” So women hide themselves and don’t share what is happening. 
(Hekima, 12 February 2018, community member, Nairobi) 
The danger of abuse of power by the anti-terror police is also problematic for civil society organizations 
who working in the local communities. This because efforts to coordinate national action on violent 
extremism at the national level have meant that the Kenyan authorities are now interested in the 
activities of civil society organizations that fit within the national strategy on countering violent 
extremism. Yet sharing this information in a country that is not taking a human-rights-based approach 
to counterterrorism can create significant risks to civil society organization’s safety and access to local 
communities. This point was illustrated by Lucy: 
If you are an organization working to counter violent extremism you have to register with the 
Counterterrorism Centre, and you have to share information about your activities with them, 
which is highly problematic. This is a security risk for the parents, the community, and all the 
people involved. It’s also problematic even in terms of our engagement with the communities 
that we’re working with. (Lucy, NGO, 11 February 2018, Nairobi)  
  
Discussion  
 
Although there is no consensus on what constitutes terrorism and violent extremism, at the global level 
these terms are largely defined from a male and state-centered perspective that favors a militarized 
approach and prioritizes the public over the private realm. Violent extremism and terrorism are 
generally considered more important, different, and disconnected from everyday violence. The focus of 
counterterrorism efforts has always been on groups that threaten Western ideologies, ways of life, and 
economic and military interests. Because they do not fit into this understanding of terrorism, other 
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experiences of violence including gender-based violence are depoliticized, trivialized and silenced. 
Against this backdrop the recent association of the WPS agenda with that of counterterrorism and 
countering violent extremism is unsettling. The Kenyan government’s 2016 counterterrorism strategy 
defines violent extremism as Islamic extremism linked to groups such as Al-Shabaab. The state’s 
response to violent extremism has been through military operations, for which it continues to receive 
support from Western allies. This hard security response has in itself become a new source of insecurity 
for local communities. The obstinate focus on Al-Shabaab and excessive military responses have led to 
violence against women and gender inequality and the patriarchal culture that produces, perpetuates 
and drives gender insecurity as well as violent extremism being overlooked. Feminist scholars have 
argued for a broader understanding of security that takes into consideration the interrelationship 
between the various forms of violence that pervade all levels of society (Tickner 1992). Violent 
extremism, like other forms of violence, is the product of gendered ideologies that produce, justify and 
sustain gender inequality. Aslam (2012) argues that in the context of her country, Pakistan, gender 
inequality and socially-constructed norms around femininity and masculinity lead to hypermasculinity 
and men’s use of violence, including terrorism. Another study, conducted in Jordan by the Arab Women 
Organization of Jordan (AWO) and the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) 
and funded by the European Union, has found strong empirical evidence linking gender-based violence 
to radicalization. In this study, areas and communities that were most affected by radicalization had 
higher rates of gender-based violence (AWO and ACTED 2016, 4-5). The study found that violence 
against women increased with radicalization, which was perceived to legitimize and encourage gender-
based violence (ibid, 4). In a recent study Castillo Díaz and Valji (2019) discuss evidence from across 
the world that misogyny is correlated with violent extremism. They argue that misogyny, as a political 
phenomenon that enforces gender inequality, is the gateway, the driver, and the early-warning sign in 
most terrorism-related violence. The strong nexus between misogyny and violent extremism, according 
to Castillo Díaz and Valji (2019), should persuade governments to divert resources to address gender 
inequality and to take misogynistic violence as seriously as all other forms of ideologically-motivated 
violent extremism. These findings are not surprising, considering that groups implicated in terrorism 
and violent extremism such as the Taliban, Al-Qaida, Boko Haram and ISIS are also known to subscribe 
24 
 
to a misogynist agenda and to perpetrate gender-based violence. Although violence against women and 
norms that legitimize and promote gender inequality are intrinsically linked to violent extremism, 
misogynist violence continues to be treated as a private problem of individuals rather than as a broader 
public security concern (Duriesmith, Ryan, and Zimmerman 2018; Castillo Díaz and Valji 2019). 
Without broadening and gendering the concept of violent extremism to include gender-based violence, 
gender inequality, and sources of gender insecurity extremist violence will not be defeated. 
 
One of the consequences of the closer link between the WPS framework and countering violent 
extremism is the redirection of development aid to prevent and counter violent extremism, as evidenced 
by the proliferation of such projects in Kenya. This is not necessarily an intended outcome, as 
international and local NGOs tend to follow donors’ interests with their programs and applications for 
project funding.  Although more evidence is required, certainly in Kenya’s case the experiences and 
perceptions of the respondents in this study are of a struggle for funding for gender, WPS and 
development projects, and increased funding and funders’ interest in work related to countering violent 
extremism.  
Western countries pursue international development in line with their national interests. For countries 
such as the UK, countering violent extremism abroad is a foreign aid priority (UK Government 2015). 
The US and the UK are Kenya’s two largest country donors of terms of development aid, providing 
USD 836 and 190.1 million respectively per year (UK Government 2015). A significant proportion of 
this aid is used for projects against violent extremism, such as NiWajibu Wetu (it’s our responsibility) 
and SCORE (Strengthening Community Resilience against Violent Extremism) launched by the United 
States Agency for International Development to reduce violent extremism among at-risk individuals 
and communities in Kenya (OECD 2016/2017). This is in addition to other military and security 
financial assistance provided to Kenya for counterterrorism operations. In August 2018 during her trip 
to Kenya the British Prime Minister Theresa May signed a new agreement to expand UK military 
counterterrorism support to Kenya in the war against Al-Shabaab (Kimanthi 2018). For donor countries, 
connecting the WPS agenda with the aim of counterterrorism is value for money. By adding “women” 
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to existing programs on countering violent extremism, governments not only ensure the alignment of 
development aid with their national interests and priorities but also kill two birds with one stone. 
Alarmingly, the WPS agenda and protecting women can be dangerously used here as justification for 
increasing funding to military operations and counterterrorism purposes.  
Unsurprisingly, the recent policy shift connecting the WPS agenda with countering violent extremism 
has not resulted in a significant increase in the participation of women, particularly those from 
marginalized communities in Kenya, in the area of countering and preventing violent extremism, which 
remains dominated by men and elites. The case of Kenya demonstrates that without contesting the 
power hierarchies on the ground or addressing the structural factors that constrain women’s agency, 
attempts to increase women’s participation will only reinforce existing inequalities. The WPS 
framework treats women as a homogenous group and ignores their fundamental differences, but 
countries in the Global South have highly diverse populations in terms of race, ethnicity, clan, religion, 
class, and other identity markers. Ignoring these differences necessarily leads to the failure to 
understand and transform how power is exercised on the ground. Without an intersectional approach, 
the integration of countering violent extremism into the WPS agenda will only reinforce the already 
unequal power relations and result in additional marginalization, violence and insecurity for women in 
minority groups. Here the question of ‘who can speak security’ within the WPS framework becomes 
extremely urgent. In the light of feminist critiques of the WPS agenda, the inability of resolution 2242 
to transform the way that counterterrorism is addressed is predictable. Without addressing the structural 
causes of women’s inequality and questioning the broader social hierarchies of gender, the inclusion of 
women in the counterterrorism structure is not enough to deliver an alternative approach to violent 
extremism and terrorism. The prioritization of “women” rather than “gender” in the WPS framework 
has only resulted in an ‘add women and stir’ approach focused on women’s participation without 
questioning or addressing the structures that produce and sustain violent extremism. The absence of 
intersectionality from the WPS resolutions is particularly made problematic with countering violent 
extremism becoming part of the agenda. 
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Instead of transforming counterterrorism, the new focus on gender and violent extremism in Kenya has 
increased women’s insecurity and buttressed stereotypes about them. This study has provided evidence 
on how women can be instrumentalized for counterterrorism purposes and reduced to informing on 
sons, daughters and husbands suspected of being involved in violent extremism. While women are used 
as a source of intelligence they are excluded from decision-making processes about how violent 
extremism is defined and how it can be addressed. The consequences of engaging women as front-line 
actors in preventing radicalism in terms of their safety and security are particularly serious in a context 
where a human-rights-based approach to counterterrorism (if it ever existed) is lacking (Ní Aoláin 
2013).  The case of Kenya also shows how in countries with diverse populations, the lack of an 
intersectional approach to women security can only exacerbate the exclusion and insecurity of 
marginalized ethnic minorities. In Kenya Muslims are noticeably more economically, socially and 
politically marginalized than other communities (Anderson and McKnight 2014; Torbjörnsson 2017). 
This marginalization is even greater for women, who represent the bottom half of most societies. The 
narrow focus on Al-Shabaab and Islamic extremism has increased the marginalization and 
stigmatization of the Muslim minority, including women. This is not unique to Kenya but common in 
other countries with Muslim minorities. During her visit to Belgium the Special Rapporteur on The 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism 
warned that many of the country’s counterterrorism and de-radicalization laws, policies, and practices 
have a stigmatizing and discriminatory effect on its Muslim migrant communities (UN Special 
Rapporteur 2018). The concept of security, as Tickner (1992) points out, is meaningless when it is built 
on the insecurity of others. As Pratt (2013) has warned, by failing to pay attention to intersectionality 
the WPS framework contributes to normalizing the discourses and practices of the “war on terror” and 
legitimizes counterterrorist and counterinsurgency violence against Muslim women and Muslim 
communities.    
 
Conclusion 
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This article has demonstrated that in the Kenyan context the integration of countering violent extremism 
into the WPS agenda has both failed to transform the government’s approach to violent extremism and 
resulted in additional marginalization, violence and insecurity for women. These results were 
precipitated by the lack of a gender inclusive and locally relevant understanding of violent extremism 
and exacerbated by the WPS resolutions’ weak commitment to gender equality, silence on race and 
intersectionality and problematic stand on security that favors militarism and the use of force. Based on 
findings from Kenya, I maintain that connecting the WPS agenda with countering violent extremism 
can have alarming consequences on the ground.     
 
Almost two decades ago the WPS resolutions were celebrated as a tool through which feminist ideas 
could be transposed into non-feminist forms of power (Aroussi 2015). Naively, the expectation was that 
the feminist content of the WPS would somehow influence and transform the way in which security 
institutions deal with gender and women’s issues. Yet, bringing the women’s agenda to the Security 
Council ran the risk of losing its feminist content. In 2002, in an early article on resolution 1325, Otto 
warned that a feminist agenda for peace necessarily requires disrupting the gender norms and structures 
that produce militarism and women’s exclusion. She cautiously argued that merely entering the 
“master’s house” would not result in meaningful transformation and that “until feminists understand 
how this conundrum can be addressed, the ‘master’s house’ will remain heavily defended against gender 
disruptions” (Otto 2006, p 118). The risk of engagement with the Security Council, a highly militarized, 
hyper-masculine, warmongering, hegemonic institution has certainly become clearer with resolution 
2242. As Heathcote points out, linking the WPS agenda with countering terrorism and violent 
extremism “underlines the reality that the Security Council cannot and does not function as a space for 
feminist law making” (Heathcote 2018, 375). 
 
The current focus on violent extremism in the WPS agenda may eventually change in the coming years 
when the international community moves its attention to a new pressing issue, but this will be one that 
does not question or seek to challenge militarism, real politics and power at the UN Security Council. 
For the intention behind including countering violent extremism in the WPS agenda was never about 
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introducing transformative feminist ideas on women’s security that would threaten the status quo. 
Instead, this policy shift is dangerously about aligning the WPS’s agenda with the rest of the Security 
Council’s work and reducing it to a mere tool for counterterrorism.  For the WPS agenda to be saved, 
it must be urgently redefined and recreated from a feminist perspective that entails bringing women’s 
everyday experiences of insecurity to the forefront, recognizing the differences and power relations 
between women, and addressing the root causes of gender inequality. But it would also, and perhaps 
more importantly, necessitate staying faithful to core feminist principles by resisting and confronting 
militarism, imperialism, colonialism, racism, inequality, and exclusion.  
 
 
Notes
1 See Security Council resolutions 2122 (2013) on women, peace and security; 2129 (2013) renewing the mandate 
of the UN Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED) and 2178 (2014) on the threats posed by foreign 
terrorist fighters. 
2 The study included Kenya, Tunisia and the UN in New York. As this article focused only on Kenya I have not 
included here any of the data collected in Tunisia in 2017. 
3 It must be noted that this study has led to a large two-year project on gender and violent extremism in Kenya 
conducted in Mombasa, Kwale and Nairobi and focusing on how violent extremism is defined, experienced and 
resisted by local communities in the everyday. Results from the second research study has confirmed and 
supplemented the research findings of this first study. 
4 The Mungiki group started as an ethnically- and culturally-exclusive radical Kikuyu protest movement 
but then turned to violence against non-Kikuyus. See Mwangi Kagwanja, Peter. 2003. “Facing Mount Kenya 
or facing Mecca? The Mungiki Ethnic Violence and the Politics of the Moi Cessation in Kenya 1987-2002.” 
African Affairs 102 (1) 25-49. 
5 For a discussion of what constitutes the local see Donais, Timothy. 2009. “Empowerment or Imposition? 
Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes.” Peace and Change 34(1): 3 – 26; Mac 
Ginty, Roger. 2015. “Where is the Local? Critical Localism and Peacebuilding.” Third World Quarterly 36(5): 
840-856. 
6 Author’s interviews with civil society’s organizations in Kenya –January, February 2018.  
7 Interviews with members of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and also my personal experience of research 
funding applications. Several CSOs refused to partner with me on projects involving countering violent extremism 
for ideological reasons but also for safety and security.  
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